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A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an impartial
jury is one of the ways the American justice system seeks to protect individuals'
due process rights.' Voir dire, the questioning of prospective jurors, is one of the
means used to ensure at least the appearance of an impartial jury, even if voir
dire does not always achieve the lofty goal of a truly impartial jury. Voir dire
facilitates the fulfillment of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right by
allowing parties to an action and their counsel to identify and exclude
prospective jurors who may harbor biases against one of the parties involved.
The federal common law defines an "impartial jury" as one drawn from a panel
that accurately reflects that community and is selected with non-discriminatory
criteria.2
In addition to protecting the parties' right to a fair trial decided by an
impartial jury, the voir dire system also encompasses a potential juror's rights,
such as the equal protection right to have the opportunity to serve as a juror? and
the right to a reasonable degree of privacy.4 The Supreme Court has held that
discriminatory practices in jury selection raise doubts about the integrity of the
entire jury system 5 and also violate the equal protection rights of the excluded
6jurors. These overlapping, and sometimes conflicting rights of the parties and
the prospective jurors all come into play when a litigant exercises a peremptory
strike.
Once either the attorneys or the court finishes questioning each juror, a party
may request the court strike the juror for cause if it is apparent the juror in unable
to render a fair and impartial verdict or is otherwise unqualified. In addition,
each party to the action is allowed a limited number of peremptory strikes,
whereby attorneys may use their intuition as to which jurors may be unfavorable
to their case.7
1. See In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
2. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. Id.
4. Press Enter. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
5. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,402 (1991).
6. Id.
7. For a brief overview of the history of the use of the peremptory strike in the United States, see A.C.
JOHNSTONE, Peremptory Pragmatism: Religion and the Administration of the Batson Rule, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 441, 443. For a discussion of how attorneys may use nonverbal cues to detect bias, see generally Jim
Goodwin, Note, Articulating the Inarticulable: Relying on Nonverbal Behavior Cues to Deception to Strike
Jurors During Voir Dire, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 739 (1996).
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Issues involving sexual orientation arise during voir dire in a variety of ways,
and they raise additional controversies. First, a court may have to decide if and
when counsel should be allowed to question venire members about possible bias
regarding sexual orientation. Second, if the court determines that such
questioning is appropriate, the judge must then decide the form, substance and
extent of such questioning, taking into consideration the rights of the parties as
well as the rights of the venire members. Third, if voir dire reveals a juror is gay,
lesbian or bisexual, the court may have to decide if this information is a legal
basis for a party to exercise a peremptory strike to remove that juror. In other
words, a court may have to decide if and when a juror's sexual orientation is
sufficient grounds for a strike for cause or a permissible basis for a peremptory
strike. This article seeks to address all of these controversies. It argues that a
juror's sexual orientation alone is never a proper basis for a peremptory strike. It
argues sexual orientation should be treated the same as race, religion, ethnicity
and gender for purposes of voir dire. This article also proposes several means by
which trial judges can protect litigants' rights to exercise peremptory challenges
against prospective jurors who may decide a case based on personal biases
regarding sexual orientation, and, at the same time, be sensitive to jurors' need
for privacy.
I. JUROR'S SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A BASIS FOR A PEREMPTORY STRIKE
A. Historical Overview of Federal Common Law Limiting Peremptory Strikes
In the landmark case of Batson v. Kentucky,9 the Supreme Court focused on
the rights of stricken jurors and held the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids a prosecutor from striking a juror simply
because of his or her race. The Court held that a prima facie case of
discrimination requires both the defendant and the stricken juror be members of
a cognizable group. The Court later modified this holding in Powers v. Ohio1° to
allow a white defendant to raise a third party equal protection claim on behalf of
black prospective jurors who were stricken from the jury panel. Powers also
states that a white criminal defendant may have the same due process claims as a
non-white defendant when the prosecution uses discriminatory means to exclude
a juror.11
The Supreme Court has focused on the harm to the individual juror as well
as the harm to the community that results from the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges. 12 It found that "[a]ll persons, when granted the
8. Although much of the analysis in this paper may also apply to transgendered individuals, this paper
focuses on issues of sexual orientation rather than gender identity solely because statutory law and caselaw has
yet to tackle the rights of transgendered people in the area of voir dire.
9. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
10. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Powers, 499 U.S. at 402; Batson, 467 U.S. at 87; Peters, 407 U.S. at 499.
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opportunity to serve on a jury, have the right not to be excluded summarily
because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and
reinforce patterns of historical discrimination." 13 Such discrimination violates
the principles of equal protection. 14 In Powers, the Court held a criminal
defendant has standing to raise the third party equal protection claims of
excluded jurors because "the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the
prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury, and the defendant has
a concrete interest in challenging the practice.' '15 Such standing was necessary
because stricken jurors are unlikely to take it upon themselves to appeal their
dismissal from a jury. Without third party standing, a criminal defendant is
limited to either a Sixth Amendment or a due process claim which, depending on
the circumstances, may have a lower likelihood of success than an equal
protection claim.
The Court later extended the holdings of Batson and Powers to sex
discriminatory peremptory challenges in Ballard v. United States16 and J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex rel. TB.17 Lower courts have held that peremptory challenges may
not be used to exclude jurors solely because of their religion,' s national origin,19
or disability. 20 In Edmonson v. Leeville Concrete Co.,21 the Supreme Court held
that Batson and its progeny apply in civil trials as well as criminal trials. In
Georgia v. McCollum,22 it held that criminal defendants have the same
restrictions on the use of peremptory strikes as the prosecution.
Early on, the Supreme Court expressed the rationale for prohibiting the
exclusion of a particular category of citizens with respect to the category of sex:
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one is different from a community composed of both; the
subtle interplay of influence one on the other is among the
imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either may not in a given
case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if
either sex is excluded.23
Following the same reasoning in Batson and other cases dealing with
peremptory strikes based on race, the Court ruled an impartial jury is one that
13. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141-42 (1994).
14. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410.
15. Id.
16. 329 U.S. 187(1946).
17. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
18. United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991). But see State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767 (Minn.
1993).
19. United States v. Biaggi, 673 F. Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that Italian-Americans are a
cognizable group). But see United States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that Italian-Americans
are not a cognizable group).
20. People v. Green, 561 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1990).
21. 500U.S.614(1991).
22. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
23. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1946).
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has the possibility of including a variety of perspectives, without the intentional
exclusion of any one in particular.14 A California court used the same reasoning
to expand the limits on peremptory strikes to include sexual orientation as an
impermissible basis for exclusion.
B. California 's Extension ofLimit on Peremptory Strikes to Include Sexual
Minorities
The California Appellate Court is the first and only court to date to hold that
jurors may not be stricken from a jury panel because of their sexual orientation.
The recent case of People v. Garcia25 held that a juror's sexual orientation
cannot be the basis for a peremptory strike. It held sexual orientation must be
treated the same as race, religion, ethnicity, and sex for purposes of voir dire in
California courts.
Garcia was a burglary case with no element of sexual orientation in either
the prosecution's or the defense's case. However, it became apparent during voir
dire that two members of the jury panel were lesbians.26 The prosecution used
two of its peremptory strikes to exclude the two lesbians. The trial court
overruled the defense's objection 27 and required no explanation from the
prosecutor for its decision to strike the two lesbian jurors. On appeal, the defense
argued that the prosecution impermissibly struck the two women because of
their sexual orientation.28
The Garcia court held that sexual minorities (limited in the case to gay,
lesbian and bisexual people) constitute a cognizable group that must be included
if a venire is to be a "representative cross-section', 29 of the community.
According to the California Supreme Court, a "cognizable group" is one whose
members "share a common perspective arising from their life experience in the
group" or a "common social or psychological outlook on human events." 30 The
Garcia court found that in "this era of 'don't ask; don't tell,"' gay, lesbian and
bisexual people share a common perspective and social outlook because of their
history of persecution. 31 With this finding, the court rejected the Attorney
General's argument that not all gay men and lesbians share a common
perspective because not all have suffered the same discrimination.32 The court
said this was simply "an argument about [the] degree" of discrimination. 33 It
24. It is important to acknowledge that some attorneys use peremptory strikes in an effort to obtain a
greater variety of perspectives, rather than to limit the diversity of a jury's members. See ABBE SMrH, "Nice
Work if You Can Get It": "Ethical" Jury Selection in Criminal Defense, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 544 (1998).
25. 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
26. Id. at 1271.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1272.
29. Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 97 (1979).
30. Id. at 98.
31. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 40h at 1276.
32. Id. at 1276-77.
33. Id. at 1276.
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held that the variety of experiences of gay politicians, Hollywood celebrities,
writers, and average gays and lesbians does not negate their common experience
of being a sexual minority.34
Under California law, a "cognizable group" must also have a unique
perspective that cannot be represented by individuals not in the group.35 The
Garcia court found that no other group can adequately represent the perspective
of gay and lesbian people. It reasoned that only certain religious and racial
minorities have suffered such "pernicious and sustained hostility" and
"immediate and severe opprobrium."36 The court emphasized that the
community at large has an interest even greater than the individual defendant in
having the perspective of sexual minorities represented in jury panels.37 In
addition, it held that to deprive gay and lesbian people from the civic duty of jury
service is to "deprive them of part of their membership in the community [and].
. . inevitably damage the [general] community as well. 3 8 The fact that gay and
lesbian people are not always recognizable did not faze that court at all. Indeed,
the court acknowledged that race and national origin are also difficult to
determine at times, but discrimination based on those characteristics is likewise
prohibited.39 Finally, the court rejected the argument that the number of sexual
minorities is not a large enough to be a "cognizable group," noting that one's
membership in a religious or national group with very few members would still
40
constitute an impermissible basis for exclusion from a jury.
In a vein similar to Batson and its progeny, the Garcia court held that
systematic exclusion of sexual minorities "would send an intolerable message"
that people may be presumed unqualified for jury service because of their sexual
orientation.4' Under California law, prospective jurors may not be excluded from
the jury panel because of their race, ethnicity, gender or similar group
42 4
membership. Citing People v. Wheeler 3 and the federal prohibition of the
discriminatory use of peremptory strikes,"n the court held that a systematic
exclusion of the perspective of sexual minorities would also violate the criminal
defendant's right to a jury panel drawn from a representative cross-section of the
community under both state law and the federal Constitution.45
34. Id.
35. Rubio, 24 Cal. 3d at 98.
36. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4' at 1279 (citing Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
37. Id. at 1279.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1280.
40. Id. at 1281.
41. Id.
42. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978).
43. Id.
44. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1281-82 (citing J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) and
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).
45. Id. at 1275.
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The California Assembly codified the Garcia holding. It proposed AB 2418
on February 24, 2000 and passed the bill on May 4, 2000.46 Codification is a
positive step in demonstrating California's refusal to sanction the exclusion or
discrimination of people based on sexual orientation. The legislation extends the
Garcia ruling to civil cases, as well as criminal cases. In addition, a state statute
prohibiting the exclusion of jurors based on their sexual orientation may
potentially bind federal courts in California.
47
However, codification of Garcia may not be fully sufficient to prevent
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Neither Garcia nor AB 2418
prohibit an attorney from striking prospective jurors who associate with or are
related to a gay, lesbian, or bisexual person. The California Assembly and the
legislatures of other states should consider enacting a statute that would prevent
attorneys from presuming bias and exercising peremptory strikes not only when
a prospective juror acknowledges that he or she is gay, lesbian or bisexual, but
also when a prospective juror acknowledges an association with someone
representing a sexual minority.48 Of course, if a juror indicated that he or she
harbors an actual bias, there is certainly a basis for a peremptory strike and
probably a strike for cause. Part II discusses how Courts should go about
determining actual bias.
C. The Future of Federal Law Limiting Peremptory Strikes Against Sexual
Minorities
Although the federal legislature has not gone to the same lengths as the
California legislature to set a precedent of intolerance for discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation,49 the Supreme Court has acknowledged widespread
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in Romer v. Evans,5 0° and it has
46. Cal. Civ. P. § 231.5
47. Whether AB 2418 binds federal courts depends on whether limits on voir dire are considered
substantive or procedural. This issue is governed by the Erie doctrine, named for Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), and is outside the scope of this paper.
48. Discrimination on the grounds that a person associates with a member of a protected group is
prohibited by other antidiscrimination law. For example, Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment
premised on an interracial relationship. Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581,589 (5th
Cir. 1998), en banc hearing reversed on other grounds in Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 169 F.3d 215 (5th
Cir. 1999); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding a white man
could bring a claim under Title VII against an employer who allegedly refused to hire plaintiff because of hi
interracial marriage); Taylor v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1199 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding employer discriminated against employee on the basis of race due to the plaintiff's interracial
marriage). See also Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, and GMC Trucks, Inc., 173 F.3d 988,
994-995 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding discharge of white employee allegedly because his child was biracial was
violation of Title VII); Fiedler v. Marumsco Christian School, 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir.1980) (holding a
parochial school violated the constitutional rights of a white student when it expelled her for her relationship
with a black student). Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides a cause of action to a white spouse who alleges
that he was discriminated against in employment because of his marriage to a nonwhite. Alizadeh v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 802 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1986).
49. California state law prohibits sexual orientation discrimination in housing, employment and
education. The Fair Employment and Housing Act. Cal. Gov. § 12920. No similar federal laws exist.
50. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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held that a state (and its agents) cannot systematically deny sexual minorities
equal protection of the law solely based on animus.51 Although the Romer Court
fell short of designating lesbian, gay and bisexual persons worthy of heightened
scrutiny under the equal protection clause, it did identify, in the context of
lesbian, gay and bisexual persons, many of the factors that contribute to a group
being designated a discrete and insular minority for the purposes of heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. There is powerful dicta in the Romer
opinion that suggests that gay, lesbian and bisexual people should have certain
protections and enjoy a degree of heightened scrutiny, including protection
against being excluded from jury service because of their sexual orientation.
Indeed there is precedent in the federal courts, in addition to the California
courts, for interpreting Batson and its progeny to prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination in voir dire. In the same year Romer was decided, the Ninth
Circuit assumed arguendo in Johnson v. Campbel 2 that criminal defendants
may be able to make a Batson-like challenge if the prosecution uses peremptory
strikes to exclude gay jurors. The court did not rule on the issue because it held
the plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination as nothing in
the record indicated that the excluded juror was gay. At trial, the plaintiffs
counsel simply stated his impression that one of the stricken jurors was gay.53 In
addition, the Ninth Circuit was disinclined to find a prima facie case of
discrimination because it believed the defense had no motive to exclude gay
jurors as long as the case did not involve any issues of sexual orientation and
none of the parties or witnesses were gay.54 Although Johnson does not provide
any precedent limiting the use of peremptory strikes against sexual minorities, it
does indicate that at least the Ninth Circuit may be willing to entertain the idea in
the future.
To a degree, prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination bias in the jury
selection process is purely an academic exercise. A skilled attorney can always
offer a non-discriminatory reason for exercising a peremptory strike, and the
likelihood of having enough gay, lesbian, or bisexual potential jurors on a given
panel to establish a pattern is minimal. Nevertheless, anecdotal data indicates a
51. Id. The Romer Court did not hold that sexual minorities are a protected class or that laws that
discriminate against them are subject to heightened scrutiny. Obviously, without such a ruling from the
Supreme Court, gay, lesbian and bisexual people do not enjoy the same federal precedent as women and racial,
religious and ethnic minorities. In contrast, a minority of states include sexual orientation as a protected
classification for such purposes as employment and housing. For a list of states, cities, and counties that
prohibit various forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation, see http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/pages/documents/record?record=217. There are also some states, such as Ohio, however, which have not
recognized these protections. However, to illustrate the point that the nation is still quite divided on the issue,
the Ohio Court of Appeals ruled, in a 1991 case, that there was no error in refusing to order the state to explain
its rationale when it exercised a peremptory challenge against a gay juror because there is no case holding that
gay persons are a cognizable group for purposes of equal protection analysis. State v. Spitler, 599 N.E.2d 408,
414 (Ohio App. 1991).
52. 92 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 1996).
53. Id. at 952.
54. Id. at 952-53.
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substantial number of potential jurors experience anti-gay bias in some form. 55
The incidents they experience undermine the goal of fairness and the integrity of
the jury system. Increased legislation may, at the very least, assure jurors and
litigants that the judiciary does not sanction such incidents.
II. OBTAINING AN IMPARTIAL JURY THROUGH VoIR DIRE
In addition to guaranteeing a jury will be drawn from a venire that fairly
represents the community, the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants
the right to exclude jurors who may be biased. "[T]he Due Process Clause
protects a defendant from jurors who are actually incapable of rendering an
impartial verdict,"5 6 but criminal prosecutors and civil litigants also share the
right to strike prospective jurors whom they suspect may be biased against their
case. Parties to a lawsuit have long been permitted to exercise peremptory
challenges against jurors who do not manifest overt bias,57 allowing attorneys to
use intuition to determine which jurors might be disinclined to find in their favor.
The right to strike prospective jurors without cause is subject only to the
limitation imposed by the Equal Protection Clause.
58
Although a party's Sixth Amendment right to make peremptory challenges to
obtain an impartial jury may appear to conflict with jurors' equal protection
rights, this is not necessarily so. The Supreme Court's prohibition of peremptory
strikes based on racial, religious, ethnic or sex-based stereotypes helps the
parties by requiring attorneys to focus on venire members' attitudes about
relevant issues rather than on assumptions about their attitudes. As the Garcia
court stated, "Commonality of perspective does not result in identity of opinion.
That is the whole reason exclusion based upon group bias is anathema. It
stereotypes. "59
The Garcia court understood that a common and unique perspective does not
translate into an automatic bias. Its analysis was similar to the U.S. Supreme
Court's reasoning that while women and racial minorities share a common
perspective, the representation of which (or at least the equal potential for
representation) is essential to ensure a jury represents a cross-section of the
55. See SEXUAL ORIENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ACCESS AND FAIRNESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION FAIRNESS IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS [hereinafter SOFC] available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/program/accessreports.htm. The study found gay and lesbian court users,
including attorneys, witnesses, and litigants, as well as jurors, had significantly more negative perceptions of
fairness in the California courts. Twenty-two percent of gay and lesbian court users felt threatened because of
their sexual orientation in general, and thirty-eight percent felt threatened when sexual orientation became an
issue. See id. at 5. In illustration of these negative experiences, one respondent in the study stated, "I was a jury
prospect but it was evident that the defense lawyer didn't want gays on the jury. One of his questions to me
during selection was: Mr. X, would you say you have more straight friends or gay friends? I was discharged."
Id., app. C. at 19.
56. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972).
57. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 108 (1986).
58. Id. at 89.
59. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4"h at 1277.
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community, that common perspective may not be used to infer bias where none
exists.
60
Like people who share a common race, ethnicity or religion, sexual
minorities may share some general experiences but may also be quite varied in
their attitudes. When an attorney decides to make a peremptory strike based on
nothing more than stereotypes, the attorney may do a disservice. 6' The attorney
may be better off asking prospective jurors about relevant issues rather than
guessing what their attitudes might be. For example, while the Catholic Church
opposes abortion, many individual Catholic people do not; while the poor in
America are overwhelmingly racial minorities, many individual African
Americans are wealthy and may be more sympathetic to corporate litigants.
Similarly, while many gay communities align themselves with feminist and
multi-cultural organizations, many individual gay, lesbian, and bisexual people
oppose the goals of such organizations. Therefore, when an attorney is
determining which juror may not be impartial, presuming certain attitudes of the
specific individuals on the jury panel based on characteristics like race, religion
and sexual orientation is less effective than asking questions likely to reveal
impartiality.
Unfortunately, actual bias against a party may not be revealed simply by
asking jurors whether they can be impartial. Jurors are invariably reluctant to
admit that they are biased and cannot render an impartial verdict. An attorney
conducting voir dire may be better able to determine bias by asking open-ended
questions and engaging the venire persons in conversation.62 However, judges
will often exercise discretion to limit many open-ended questions in open court
in the interest of time 6 3 and in an effort to avoid juror boredom and/or
resentment.64 Also, many trial attorneys resist asking open-ended questions for
fear that an unexpected answer may negatively impact other prospective jurors
65or may fluster or offend an inarticulate or self-conscious venire person.
Even though attorneys conducting voir dire may wish to know prospective
jurors' and their acquaintances' sexual orientation under the premise (correct or
not) that sexual orientation provides some insight into a juror's attitudes about
60. Compare Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-194 ("[A] distinct flavor is lost if either sex is excluded.") with
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 141-142 ("All persons, when granted the opportunity to serve on a jury, have the right not to
be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and reinforce
patterns of historical discrimination.").
61. I acknowledge that attitudes towards women and various minorities may be subtle issues in cases,
such as when jurors must chose between different witness' accounts of an event. Although judges may not be
inclined to allow voir dire on attitudes towards women and minorities in such cases, such questioning would be
ideal to truly gage jurors' ability to consider all evidence in an impartial manner.
62. See HON. ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 30 (2 ed. 1989); V. HALE STARR& MARK
MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION 3d ed. § 10.03[G] (2001).
63. Id. at 31.
64. E.g., Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 315 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that a trial judge's refusal to ask
open-ended questions regarding anti-gay bias was not an abuse of discretion).
65. Id.
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various other matters, the purpose of voir dire is "not to afford individual
analysis in depth to permit a party to choose a jury that fits into some mold the
party believes appropriate for his or her case." 67 The purpose of voir dire is
limited to excluding jurors who are biased against a party, not those who simply
do not favor a party. Despite the use of jury experts who assist counsel in
obtaining a jury partial to their side (as opposed to an impartial jury), most
litigants cannot afford to sponsor such extensive social science research.
Although the Garcia court stated that attorneys should not ask venire persons
to indicate their sexual orientation, 68 it did not seem to realize that more banal
questions do effectively ask for that information. Questions about marital status
and cohabitation do reveal the sexual orientation of venire persons who live with
their same-sex "spouses" or life partners. Those who do not wish to indicate
their sexual orientation are forced to either perjure themselves or indicate to the
court that the question is personal in nature and request a hearing. A juror's right
to request a hearing if she or he does not wish to answer a question in open court
is discussed below.
A. The Mechanics of Voir Dire
In the majority of federal courts, it is the judge who conducts voir dire, or at
least most of it. Proponents of judge-conducted voir dire argue that it prevents
attorneys from abusing voir dire by using it to argue their case and woo jurors,
and it is more time efficient. 69 Even when the judge does all the questioning,
attorneys may still submit questions to the judge for voir dire. Some courts allow
attorneys to give venire persons a supplemental juror questionnaire in addition to
• • 70
the standard qualification questionnaire.
In some state courts, the attorneys conduct voir dire.71 Some studies indicate
that this less formal interview method elicits more honest responses from
prospective jurors.7 2 In addition, attorneys are able to evaluate venire persons'
nonverbal responses better if they are conducting voir dire.73 What is more, there
is a risk that a judge may inadvertently and non-verbally express some bias
66. Sexual orientation may be used to predict certain traits just as race, age, sex, and socioeconomic
status is used to predict traits. One author suggests that Hispanics tend to be passive during deliberations,
Chinese people tend to go along with the majority, young people do not award high damages, Black people
tend to favor civil plaintiffs and criminal defendants, people tend to be less forgiving of their own sex, and
women react more to pain and suffering. WENKE, supra note 62, at 77-79, 87-89.
67. Schlinsky v. United States, 379 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1967).
68. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th at 1280 ("[N]o one should be allowed to inquire about [a juror's sexual
orientation].").
69. V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCoRMICK, JURY SELECTION § 10.0.1 (2d ed. 1993).
70. Id at. § 10.0.2.
71. In certain Connecticut state courts, the attorneys conduct individual voir dire without the presence of
the judge. Debora A. Cancado, Note, The Inadequacy of the Massachusetts Voir Dire, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL &
APp. ADv. 81, 93 (2000).
72. Id. at 94.; Susan E. Jones, Judge-Versus-Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation
of Juror Candor, 11 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 131, 144 (1987).
73. STARR, supra note 62, § 10.0.2.
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while conducting voir dire.74 The jurors know the attorneys favor their own
clients and are less likely to be influenced by bias expressed during voir dire
conducted by the attorneys. In some courts, the judge conducts preliminary voir
dire and counsel ask more specific questions.
Questions may be put to venire persons in written form on a juror
questionnaire; collectively, when a judge or attorney asks the panel as a group
(also called "general voir dire"); or individually ("individual voir dire"). Usually,
when jurors are verbally asked a question, they must answer out loud, on the
record, and before the other prospective jurors. However, when a question is
sensitive or potentially embarrassing, the court has discretion to close voir dire
from the press, 75 seal the record, or even ask the questions outside the presence
of the other prospective jurors. Such measures may encourage jurors to be more
forthcoming.
B. Revealing Bias While Ensuring that Jurors are Not Excluded Based on Sexual
Orientation
Even if an attorney does not specifically ask jurors to reveal their sexual
orientation, asking jurors if they are affiliated with any gay communities,
patronize gay businesses, or are members of gay organizations is, practically
speaking, the same as asking their sexual orientation. Although it is certainly
possible that a heterosexual juror may be involved with gay organizations and
communities, it is considerably less likely, and other questions may still reveal
the juror to be heterosexual. The problem, then, is how attorneys can win a
Batson-like motion in a state court, claiming a juror is being excluded because of
sexual orientation, if the juror reveals involvement in a gay community, or has
gay family members or acquaintances, but does not explicitly state he or she is
gay. Although the attorney moving to strike may not presume bias simply from
sexual orientation, the attorney may try to argue that involvement in gay
communities and organizations indicates a pro-gay bias. In a contrasting but
analogous situation, an attorney representing a gay client may try to exclude
jurors who reveal that they are especially active in their church or in religiously
affiliated organizations under the presumption that such involvement, rather than
simply the religious affiliation, implies bias against gay people.
Cases dealing with racist or anti-Semitic bias provide a useful analogy and
establish some precedent. In US. v. Greer,76 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a trial
judge's refusal to exclude Hispanic and Jewish jurors for cause and refusal to
require the jurors to reveal whether they were Jewish.7 7 The defendants, several
white supremacists, were convicted of conspiracy to injure, oppress, threaten and
74. Id.
75. Id. at § 11.2.8. Some states, however, do not allow the press to be excluded from the jury selection
process.
76. 939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991).
77 Id. at 1084.
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intimidate black and Hispanic people patronizing a public park.78 The defendants
were also convicted of conspiracy to deprive Jewish people of their right to own
property by vandalizing a synagogue and Jewish owned businesses and firing a
gun into synagogue windows.79 The defendants argued that because all black,
Hispanic, and Jewish people were the intended victims of the crimes, they
should have all been excluded from the jury.80 The circuit court disagreed. It held
that the only intended victims of the crimes were black and Hispanic people who
happened to have been denied entry into the park by the defendants at the time
the defendants decided to assault them. Likewise, the only intended Jewish
victims were those who suffered a loss of property. Therefore, the court reasoned
that the Hispanic and Jewish jurors could not be struck for cause, and the defense
could not use peremptory challenges against them without running afoul of
Batson and its progeny. The court held that the trial judge properly allowed each
juror to be questioned individually for bias, in a manner reasonably calculated to
identify any actual or intended victims of the alleged crime, and the trial judge
was not required to ask the Jewish jurors to identify themselves.8 1
Despite Greer's positive outcome, prohibiting the systematic exclusion of
black, Hispanic and Jewish jurors, and the court's refusal to presume bias, the
strength of its precedent is diminished by poor reasoning. After all, one of the
rationales of hate crime legislation is that hate crimes do not simply hurt the
victim but hurt all people with the same characteristics as the victim. Hate
crimes are subject to heightened penalties because they create fear in the hearts
and minds of a whole category of people. Under this rationale, the defendants in
Greer had the stronger argument for excluding the Jewish and Hispanic jurors.
The defendants sought to intimidate and threaten all black, Hispanic and Jewish
residents of Dallas, not just those who had the misfortune of suffering directly
from their crimes. Therefore, the Hispanic and Jewish members of the jury
should have been excluded because of their connection, albeit an indirect one, to
the charged crimes.
The Greer court relied on the Fourth Circuit's holding in Person v. Miller.8 2
The defendants in Miller were members of the Carolina Knights of the Ku Klux
Klan. They were convicted of violating a court order prohibiting them from
operating a paramilitary organization.83 Miller argued on appeal that the trial
court should have allowed him to exclude all prospective black jurors because
they were the beneficiaries of the court order in question, even though the jurors
had not shown actual bias.s4 The Miller court held the situation did not invoke
78. Id. at 1081.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1084.
81. Id. at 1085.
82. 854 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1988).
83. Id. at 658.
84. Id. at 664.
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the doctrine of implied bias.85 In determining whether to apply the doctrine of
implied bias, the court ruled it was not "highly unlikely that the average [black]
person could remain impartial under the circumstances." 86 The court found no
abuse of power when the district court refused to excuse for cause a black juror
who admitted to being a member of the NAACP because of the juror's repeated
assertions that he was able to render a fair and impartial verdict on the
evidence.87 In spite of the possibility that the entire black community had a stake
in the outcome of the trial, the circuit court held that black prospective jurors
"have no greater interest in vindicating the court's authority than any other
member of the general public. 88 The reasoning in Miller is stronger than in
Greer because it focused on the issue of actual bias rather than avoiding the issue
of whether the defendants were victims of the crimes in question. The Miller
court went directly to the heart of the matter by inquiring whether the jury was
impartial and by refusing to presume black jurors could not be impartial in a case
involving white supremacists. The Miller court correctly held the defense simply
could not infer bias solely because of a prospective juror's race.
An attorney may ask jurors directly or indirectly whether they believe they
can be impartial under the circumstances of the case, as the trial court did in
Miller. Although jurors may harbor unconscious bias or feel uncomfortable
admitting a conscious bias, they may be more cognizant of their duty to render
an impartial verdict after affirming to the court their professed ability to do so.
During voir dire, counsel and/or the court may inform the prospective juror of
the major facts and issues in the case. If there is a possibility the issue of sexual
orientation will arise during the trial, counsel may feel it is important to reveal to
the venire members that one or more parties or witnesses is gay, or that there is
some issue related to sexual orientation in the case. Counsel or the judge may
formulate one or more questions in an attempt to reveal whether any venire
member would be unable to decide the case based solely on the evidence
presented and without being influenced by personal feelings about
homosexuality.
C. Determining Actual Bias Through Direct Questioning
The court has broad discretion as to the number and substance of voir dire
questions. A verdict will not be overturned based on a trial judge's decisions
relating to voir dire unless there is a clear abuse of power. 89 Therefore, it is very
difficult to successfully appeal a judge's decisions regarding voir dire. However,
federal law requires trial judges to allow direct questioning with regard to bias
85. Id. Citing Smith v. Phillips, the Miller court concluded the current case did not meet the limited
application required by the Supreme Court. Smith v. Phillips 455 U.S. 209, 221-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. Miller, 854 F.2d at 664.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 665.
89. E.g., Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 664 N.E.2d 833, 838 (Mass. 1996); Connecticut v. Lewis, 602 A.2d
618,620 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
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when there is a "reasonable possibility" that jurors will be influenced by such
bias. 9° In Ham v. South Carolina,91 the Supreme Court held a trial judge's refusal
to allow voir dire concerning jurors' racial bias violated the black defendant's
due process rights and was a reversible error.9 2 The defendant's "basic defense at
trial was that law enforcement officers were 'out to get him' because of his civil
right activities, and that he had been framed on the drug charge."93 To this day,
the federal judiciary has not yet ruled on whether Ham applies to civil cases as
well. Lower courts have struggled with how far to extend the Ham ruling in
criminal cases, and a few have considered applying the ruling when sexual
orientation is an issue in the case or when the defendant or a witness in a case is
gay, lesbian or bisexual.94 Although a thorough analysis is beyond the scope of
this paper, the principles of due process probably do require that civil litigants be
allowed to question jurors regarding racial and similar forms of bias. It is
essentially up to the trial attorneys to convince the judge that the possibility of
bias warrants voir dire questioning on the issue. Courts have varied in their
receptivity depending on the circumstances of the case.
In US. v. Click,95 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's refusal to allow
voir dire on the issue of bias regarding sexual orientation when the defendant
was, or at least appeared to be, gay. The trial judge did not allow the line of
questioning, stating it was "improper because it would unnecessarily call
attention to [the defendant's] effeminate mannerisms" and because sexual
orientation was not part of the defense's case.9 6 In contrast, the Maine Supreme
Court stated in State v. Lovely,97 "It is axiomatic that a juror who admittedly
harbors anti-homosexual prejudice should be subject to inquiry at the trial of an
individual who is or may be perceived to be a homosexual.0
8
Courts have also been forced to determine whether a juror who expressed
disapproval of homosexuality can be stricken for cause in a case that involves
90. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524,527 (1973).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 525.
94. The following cases provide some examples of the ways that the Ham ruling has been applied:
Hernandez v. State, 357 Md. 204, 742 A.2d 952 (1999) (limiting the form of voir dire questions a criminal
defendant may put to a jury panel regarding racial and ethnic bias); State v. Rulon, 935 S.W.2d 723, 726
(Mo.App. E.D. 1996) (assuming the Ham ruling applies to anti-gay prejudice and holding a question asking
jurors if they would be prejudiced by the defendant's homosexual relationship with the victim was
constitutionally sufficient); U.S. ex rel. Gacy v. Welbom, 1992 WL 211018, *12-*16 (N.D.nll. 1992) (holding
the trial court's asking each juror whether the juror could "put aside" any feeling the juror might have about
homosexuality and decide the case impartially was constitutionally sufficient); Harlee v. District of Columbia,
558 A.2d 351, 354 (D.C. 1989) (holding Ham does not require questions to the jury panel as to "prejudices
involving men" and "sex crimes with little girls"); U. S. v. Chapin, 515 F.2d 1274, 1289 (D.C. Cir.1975)
(holding the trail court did not err by refusing to ask potential jurors questions concerning the voter
registration); Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 140 (holding the trial court's failure to ask specific questions as to
the possible effect of educational, political, and religious biases did not reach the level of a constitutional
violation as illustrated in Ham).
95. 807 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1986).
96. Id. at 850.
97. 451 A.2d 900 (Me. 1982).
98. Id. at 902.
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issues of sexual orientation. In Baker v. State,99 a Georgia appellate court
affirmed the conviction of a gay man even though some of the jury members
"expressed religious belief in opposition to homosexuality" 1°° because "no juror
responded that he or she could not be fair and impartial." 10 1 The court held that
"[a] belief in God's ultimate judgement does not automatically preclude a person
from fairly and impartially sitting in judgment of others based on the laws of the
commonwealth." 10 2
In Gacy v. Welborn, 10 3 the Seventh Circuit affirmed a trial judge's ruling that
defense counsel limit voir dire to direct questioning regarding anti-gay bias.104
The defense requested open-ended questions about each potential juror's views
about homosexuality. The circuit court stated its concern that such open-ended
questions would consume too much time and risk offending some jurors or make
them flustered, resentful, or anesthetized. The court added that the real issue was
whether the jurors were biased, regardless of their personal views about
homosexuality.10 5 A Pennsylvania appellate court also expressed this view when
it affirmed a jury's conviction even though the trial judge only allowed the
defendant to ask jurors "whether the defendant's homosexuality would prejudice
him or her"'1 6 and "restricted questions probing the jurors' personal viewpoints
on the morality of homosexuality.'
0 7
Yet, other trial courts have given counsel greater leeway in questioning
prospecting jurors about their biases. In State v. Rulon,l10 a Missouri appellate
court reviewed the extent of voir dire in a criminal case. The trial judge
permitted the defense attorney to ask who among the venire persons shared the
view that "homosexuality is against God's law."'1 9 The judge also permitted the
defense attorney to ask if the venire persons could "follow man's law" instead,
and if they would give "different weight to the defendant's testimony because he
[was] gay." 1 Although the defendant had no issue with any particular juror, he
argued the trial judge should have allowed even more extensive questioning on
the issue of anti-gay bias. The appellate court felt that the defense had ample
information to detect bias."'
Although the limited voir dire allowed in cases like Baker v. State and Gacy
v. Wellborn may leave gay rights advocates unsettled, direct questioning about
bias rather than open-ended questions may be the best option to avoid improper
assumptions of bias. Here lies the tension between a litigant's right to exercise a
99. 498 S.E.2d 290 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998)
100. Id. at 292.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1993).
104. Id. at 315.
105. Id.
106. Commonwealth v. Jones, 570 A.2d 1338, 1347 (Pa. Super. 1990).
107. Id.
108. 935 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
109. Id. at 724.
110. Id. at 725.
111. Id. at 726.
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peremptory strike against a juror the litigant believes (however subjectively)
may be unfavorable to her case, and a juror's right to not be presumed biased on
account of membership in a minority group. 112 It is also important to
acknowledge the argument that it is more important to protect the rights of
criminal defendants whose life and liberty is on the line than to protect the
dignity of a prospective juror. 113 While I favor tipping the balance in favor of
ensuring criminal defendants feel they are being tried by an impartial jury, the
public's confidence in the jury system is also of utmost importance. Regardless,
the same standard must apply no matter who the litigants are and who is on the
jury panel. If we believe that a gay juror can be impartial in the criminal case of
a gay-basher, we must also give the same credence to people who have religious
convictions against same-sex relationships if they promise to be impartial and
judge a gay defendant based solely on the laws of the land.
D. Individual Voir Dire as a Means to Detect Bias: A Case Study of
Massachusetts Common Law
Individual voir dire may be a better way to ferret out bias against (and for)
homosexuality then general voir dire (where questions are posed to the entire
jury panel) because prospective jurors are likely to be more honest and open
when they are questioned individually, apart from other venire members. As one
court noted, "Collective questioning on sensitive issues may not elicit a response
from some jurors who would respond in private." ' 14 Some states limit trial
judges' discretion in voir dire somewhat by requiring that prospective jurors be
questioned individually, rather than as a group, if counsel requests individual
voir dire regarding bias of a particularly sensitive nature.
Massachusetts is one state that imposes such a limitation on trial judges'
discretion during voir dire. Although no state has held that issues of sexual
orientation are so sensitive that a party has an absolute right to individually
question prospective jurors, 115 this section explains that states should, upon
counsel's request, require individual voir dire of jurors concerning attitudes
about sexual orientation for the same reasons they require it in other
circumstances. Massachusetts and Maine' 16 are the only states that have
addressed the issue of individual rather than general voir dire concerning anti-
gay bias. This section focuses on Massachusetts because it is the only state
whose courts have addressed the issue more than one time and also because
Massachusetts law requires individual voir dire in arguably analogous
circumstances.
112. "The problem is that we do not live in a color-blind - or for that matter, gender-blind - society and
citizens, no matter how well-intended, do not suddenly abandon racist or sexist attitudes when summoned for
jury duty." SMITH, supra note 24, at 540. The same reasoning applies to anti-gay bias.
113. Id. at 542.
114. Commonwealth v. Shelly, 409 N.E.2d 732, 740, n.12 (Mass. 1980).
115. Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 664 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. 1996).
116. State v. Lambert, 528 A.2d 890 (Me. 1987).
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Massachusetts General Law, chapter 234, section 28 provides:
For the purpose of determining whether a juror stands indifferent in the
case, if it appears that, as a result of the impact of considerations which
may cause a decision or decisions to be made in whole or in part upon
issues extraneous to the case, . . . the court shall, or the parties or their
attorneys may, with the permission and under the direction of the court,
examine the juror specifically with respect to such considerations,
attitudes, exposure, opinions or any other matters which may, as
aforesaid, cause a decision or decisions to be made in whole or in part
upon issues extraneous to the issues in the case. Such examination may
include a brief statement of the facts of the case, to the extent the facts
are appropriate and relevant to the issue of such examination, and shall
be conducted individually and outside the presence of other persons
about to be called as jurors or already called.'i1
Section 28 essentially requires that prospective jurors be individually questioned
outside the presence of other jurors when there is a risk that jurors may decide a
case based on "extraneous" issues. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has
held that section 28 applies in cases of sexual offenses against minors,'
18
interracial murder,119 interracial rape, 120 and when a criminal defendant seeks to
use the defense of insanity.12' However, the Massachusetts Supreme Court has
not yet decided to extend the requirement of individual voir dire (when
requested) to cases involving homosexuality and/or gay, lesbian, or bisexual
parties or witnesses.
22
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held prospective jurors should be
individually questioned about racial bias in murder and rape cases. In such cases,
the record need not specifically show a risk that jurors might be influenced by
racial prejudice. Upon announcing the ruling, the court simply stated, "[A]s a
matter of law interracial rape cases present a substantial risk that extraneous
issues will influence the jury and hence are within [the scope of section 28].' '123
In a later case, the court added, "We have no doubt that [a case involving] a
black defendant ... charged with sexual offenses against a white child ... is
equally likely to inflame racial prejudice ....
117. MASS. GEN. LAWS chi. 234,28 (2000)
118. Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 630 N.E.2d 265 (Mass. 1994) (on request, in cases involving sexual
offenses against a minor, individual voir dire is required as to whether the juror had been a victim of childhood
sexual offense); Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 434 N.E.2d 633 (Mass. 1982) (on request, individual voir dire is
required in cases involving interracial sexual offenses against children).
119. Commonwealth v. Young, 517 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 1987) (overruled in part on other grounds in
Commonwealth v. Ramirez, 555 N.E.2d 208 (Mass. 1990).
120. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 421 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1981) (overruled in part on other grounds by
Ramirez, 555 N.E.2d 208 (Mass. 1990)).
121. Commonwealth v. Seguin, 656 N.E.2d 1229 (Mass. 1995).
122. Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 664 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. 1996).
123. Sanders, 421 N.E.2d at 438.
124. Commonwealth v. Hobbs, 434 N.E.2d 633, 641 (Mass. 1982).
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Massachusetts also requires trial judges to allow individual voir dire
concerning their experiences with sexual offenses against a child because state
courts have recognized prospective jurors may be disinclined to admit such
experiences in open court. In Commonwealth v. Flebotte,125 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court announced the requirement and stated, "adult victims of
childhood sexual offenses may be reluctant to come forward from a venire and
discuss such a private and highly emotional event with a judge; they may be
embarrassed about it, they may feel it would not affect their objectivity, or they
may just not want to discuss it.'' 126 The facts of Flebotte differed from those in
the interracial rape and murder cases because the possible bias was revealed
"during jury deliberations, [when] the foreman notified the judge that one juror
mentioned that he had been the victim of a childhood sexual offense. 127
Therefore, the state supreme court had some evidence to support its contention
that prospective jurors may be reluctant to reveal experiences with childhood
sexual offenses.
In Commonwealth v. Seguin,128 the Massachusetts Supreme Court again
announced a "prospective rule:"
[T]he judge shall inquire individually, in some manner, whether the juror
has any opinion that would prevent him or her from returning a verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity, if the Commonwealth fails in its burden
to prove the defendant criminally responsible. 129
As in Flebotte, the Seguin court's only justification for the mandate was the fact
that during voir dire, "some potential jurors identified themselves as opposed to
the use of that defense [of insanity], and some potential jurors stated that the
defendant must have been insane to do what he did."'130 The court provided no
additional reasoning beyond the venire persons' rejection or skepticism of the
defense of insanity.
In Commonwealth v. Plunkett,131 the Massachusetts Supreme Court
suggested section 28 may be applicable when sexual orientation is an issue in the
case, 132 although the court decided the case on other grounds. The court stated
that on remand, "the trial judge need not, but may, conduct individual voir dire
concerning the possible effect on each juror of evidence that the victim [in a
criminal case] was a homosexual or bisexual.'133 The court's only professed
125. 630 N.E. 2d 203, 269 (Mass. App. 1993).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 656 N.E. 2d 1229 (Mass. 1995).
129. Id. at 1233.
130. Id. at 1232.
131. 664 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. 1996).
132. Id. at 838.
133. Id. "After telling the venire that the evidence might indicate that the victim was a homosexual or
bisexual, the judge inquired: 'Is there anything about that circumstance which would interfere with anyone's
ability to be fair and impartial?' and 'is there anything about that circumstance that would bias or prejudice
anyone against either the prosecution or the defense?' Id. at 838, fn.3.
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reason for not requiring individual voir dire regarding anti-gay bias was its wish
to not break with the traditional view that voir dire be left to the trial judge's
discretion, 134 despite the court's acknowledgement that "[t]he subject of juror
attitudes toward homosexuality may be important in a case such as this,"' 35 The
court added, "[t]he subject requires careful attention, but we are not prepared to
mandate an individual voir dire in the circumstances of this case."' 136 However,
the fact that eight of the approximately eighty venire members came forward in
response to the questions about anti-gay bias posed to the entire panel' 37 may
have convinced that court that, at least in the Plunkett trial, general voir dire
concerning homosexuality was sufficient to remove biased jurors. The court did
not consider the possibility that more than eight of the venire members were
either unconsciously biased or chose not to admit their bias in open court.138 The
court also failed to consider that individuals may be more likely to reveal
socially unacceptable ideas or embarrassing information when no action, rather
than an affirmative action, is required. 1
39
Nine years before the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided Plunkett, it
ruled on the same issue in Commonwealth v. Boyer. 14 The defendant in Boyer, a
gay man, argued that section 28 mandated individual voir dire "because the
defendant was in a class (i.e., homosexuals) against whom jurors might hold
'preconceived opinions."' The trial judge denied the defendant's motion to
individually ask prospective jurors several questions regarding their attitudes
about homosexuality, 141 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that this
134. Id. at 838.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. One prospective juror stated, "I have two homosexual sons and would be biased." Id. at n.4. The
majority of those who were excused for bias expressed negative attitudes toward homosexuals. Id.
138. It is possible that more than one venire member had a gay child or other close relations who were
gay but were uncomfortable stating so in open court. Although I would argue that this information would not be
grounds for removing such a juror for cause nor a permissible basis for a peremptory strike, such a juror may
have admitted bias if questioned individually.
139. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 69, §11.2.1. The author describes a case where two thirds of
the venire persons did not raise their hands when asked "How many of you have never had an experience with
sexual abuse?" In comparison, when a different panel was asked to raise their hands if they had had an
experience with sexual abuse, no one raised their hands, and only two people came forward at the end of voir
dire to inform the court of additional information they had chosen not to state during questioning. See also
David Suggs and Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self Disclosure in Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J.
245, 260 (1981); JURYTRIAL INNOVATIONS, §III-1, at 68 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al, eds., 1997).
140. 507 N.E.2d 1024 (Mass. 1987). Between the decisions of Boyer and Plunkett, two intermediate
appellate courts also held that individual voir dire was not required when questioning jurors about bias
regarding sexual orientation. Commonwealth v. McGregor, 655 N.E.2d 1278 (Mass. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Proulx, 612 N.E.2d 1210, 1211 (Mass. 1993). The Supreme Court of Massachusetts also heard the issue in
Commonwealth v. Shelly, 409 N.E.2d 732, 740 (Mass. 1980). As in Boyer, the Shelly court required "some
basis for finding a substantial risk that extraneous issues would influence the jury" before requiring individual
voir dire concerning anti-gay bias. Id. at 740. The court reasoned that since "no avowed homosexuals testified"
in the case, there was little risk that 'preconceived opinions toward the credibility of' homosexuals would...
have influenced the jury" even though there was evidence that the defendant was gay. Id. at 740.
141. Defendant's counsel wished to inform jurors that the defendant was a homosexual and individually
ask them the following questions: "Do you have feelings about homosexuals that might make it difficult for
you to be impartial in deciding this case? Do you believe that homosexuality should be illegal? Are you a
member of a religion that regards homosexuality as a sin? If so, might your religious beliefs influence you in
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ruling was within the trial judge's discretion. Though the court conceded that
"bias against homosexuals may exist among some people," 142 it held that
"[t]here was no basis in the record to require the judge to determine that there
was a substantial risk of extraneous influences on the jury., 143 It stated that only
questions "aimed at 'revealing racial bias or any similarly indurated and
pervasive prejudice"' ' 144 are required by Massachusetts' constitution, and that
"[a]bsent some reason to suspect that jurors may be so prejudiced.., a judge is
warranted in relying upon his final charge to the jury to purge any bias from the
jurors prior to their deliberations. 145
Essentially, the court resisted applying section 28 to issues of sexual
orientation, 146 preferring to limit its mandate of individual voir dire to issues of
race. The court did not expand on why it demanded "some basis in the record"
indicating that the jurors in the Boyer trial may have been affected by anti-gay
bias, nor did it explain what sort of evidence would have been sufficient to prove
such bias. After all, the parties in cases involving interracial rape, interracial
murder, or sexual offenses against a child are not required to provide a basis in
the record showing there is a substantial risk that jurors may decide such cases
based on the "extraneous influence" of either racial bias or exposure to sexual
offenses against a child. The Boyer court did not indicate why it refused to
presume anti-gay bias is as likely as racial bias to influence a juror's decision or
that anti-gay bias is a prejudice as "similarly indurate and pervasive" as racial
prejudice.
The Plunkett decision only cited the Boyer decision once, in support of the
proposition that traditionally the trial judge has discretion to decide whether
questions are asked of prospective jurors collectively or individually. The
Plunkett court gave no indication that the Boyer holding definitively decided the
issue of whether questions concerning anti-gay bias fall within the scope of
section 28. Its statement, "The subject requires careful attention, but we are not
prepared to mandate an individual voir dire in the circumstances of this case,147
implies that the Massachusetts Supreme Court may be willing to mandate
individual voir dire, upon request, in a future case involving issues of sexual
orientation. Because the reasons the court has professed for requiring individual
voir dire in other circumstances apply equally to the risk of juror bias regarding
sexual orientation, Massachusetts courts should expand the scope of section 28
to include questions concerning such bias.
deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence? Do you believe that homosexuals are more likely to engage in
illegal sexual acts than other people?" Id. at 1026, n 2.
142. Id. at 1026.
143. Id. at 1027.
144. Id. at 1026 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rhoads, 379 Mass. 810, 821 (1980)).
145. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Estremera, 383 Mass. 382, 388).
146. Id. ("To accept the defendant's contention in this case would be tantamount to ruling that individual
voir dire is required in every case involving charges of crimes of a sexual nature against an avowed
homosexual. We are not inclined to go so far.")
147. Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 664 N.E.2d 833, 838 (Mass. 1996).
[Vol. 13: 1
Sexual Orientation and Voir Dire
The reasons the Massachusetts Supreme Court provided for requiring
individual voir dire in cases involving interracial murder and rape, sexual
offenses against a minor, and the defense of insanity are equally applicable to
cases involving sexual orientation issues. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts
has indicated that "homosexuals might constitute a class"'148 under section 28
even though it has not held that the class of homosexuals suffer prejudice
sufficient to warrant the application of section 28. Despite the Boyer court's
refusal to acknowledge it, prejudice against sexual minorities is certainly as
pervasive as racial bias; and there is probably as much if not more of a risk that
jurors will be influenced by that bias. Sinular to the reasoning in Flebotte,
individual voir dire is appropriate in cases involving sexual orientation because
jurors may be embarrassed to come forward to reveal they are gay or that they
have a close friend or relative who is gay. Furthermore, based on the reasoning
in Seguin, there can be no doubt that prospective jurors hold a variety of
different opinions about homosexuality which may influence their deliberations
in a case involving some issue of sexual orientation.
Although case law in Massachusetts provides the best precedent for
requiring individual voir dire concerning prejudice regarding issues of sexual
orientation, the rationale applies with equal force in other state courts and in
federal courts. Individual voir dire provides additional assurance the parties will
receive a fair trial, and it saves prospective jurors from revealing embarrassing
information or unpopular ideas in open court. The following section focuses on
this second idea, exploring various ways to protect juror privacy while
preserving the rights of the parties and the public's right to an open trial.
III. JUROR PRIVACY
A. Federal Law on Juror Privacy
Although not formally a rationale for protecting jurors' reasonable
expectations of privacy, the hope that citizens will not begrudge jury service has
motivated some judges to uphold juror's demands for privacy. 149 Just as some
prospective jurors may resist answering confidential questions about their
religion, political affiliations, and organizational memberships, 15° some jurors
may find questions about their sexual orientation and the sexual orientation of
their family members and friends to be overly intrusive. 151 Though some may
148. Commonwealth v. Shelley, 409 N.E.2d 732, 740 n. 11.
149. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765 (1929) (stating that if prospective jurors know they may
be "shadowed" by investigators, "they will either shun the burdens of service or perform it with disquiet and
disgust"); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140 (stating that "prospective jurors will be less than willing
to serve if they know that inquiry into their essentially private concerns will be pressed").
150. Brandborg v. Lucas, 891 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
151. Gay and lesbian court participants in California, including jurors, attorneys, litigants, and witnesses,
report they believed their sexual orientation was raised as an issue almost as often when it did not pertain to the
case as when it did. See SOFC, supra note 55, at 5. When the gay and lesbian potential jurors were asked if
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not take offense to such questions if they understand that the questions are
relevant to the case,152 others may harbor shame or fear that prevents them from
fully discussing issues of sexual orientation in open court.
The Supreme Court considered the issue of juror privacy in Press Enterprise
v. Superior Court.153 Press Enterprise involved a newspaper's petition for writ of
mandate to compel the release of closed voir dire proceedings and to vacate the
order closing voir dire from the public in a high profile case involving the rape
and murder of a teenage girl.1 54 Voir dire included some questions regarding the
prospective jurors' experience with rape. Counsel on both sides of the criminal
trial agreed that "release of the transcript would violate the jurors' right of
privacy," especially because the jurors answered voir dire questions "under an
'implied promise of confidentiality."",15' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held
that the transcripts must be released to the public absent "an overriding interest
based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. '156 Despite the private nature of some of
the voir dire questions, the Court held that the trial court was required "to
consider whether alternatives were available to protect the interests of the
prospective jurors that the trial court's orders sought to guard" before closing the
voir dire proceedings. 1
57
The Court did not completely forsake jurors' rights to privacy. It stated that
the trial judge:
should inform the array of prospective jurors, once the general nature of
sensitive questions is made known to them, that those individuals
believing public questioning will prove damaging because of
embarrassment, may properly request an opportunity to present the
problem to the judge in camera but with counsel present and on the
record.15
8
However, the Court stopped short of holding that all embarrassing or sensitive
information revealed by prospective jurors during voir dire should be sealed. It
stated that only "those parts of the transcript reasonably entitled to privacy" and
"such parts... as necessary to preserve the anonymity of the individuals sought
to be protected"'159 should be sealed. Thus, the Press Enterprise ruling does not
guarantee that a juror can refuse to answer a question she finds too personal, nor
does it guarantee that a juror's answer to a personal question will remain
they were married, most responded incompletely. Many felt forced to state their sexual orientation when they
did not want to do so. Id. at 4 & app. C at 15.
152. STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 69 §§ 10.2.3-10.2.5.
153. 464U.S. 501 (1984).
154. Id. at503:
155. Id. at 504.
156. Id. at 510.
157. Id. at 511.
158. Id. at 512.
159. Id. at 513.
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confidential. It simply allows a juror to request a private hearing to determine
whether her privacy interests outweigh the need for the attorneys and the public
to know the answer to the question.
In its ruling, the Court failed to recognize that simply by requesting a
hearing, the juror has already called attention to herself and has implicitly
indicated that she has something to hide. In addition, even if the juror's answer
to a private question remains sealed, revealing the answer to the judge, the
parties, and their attorneys may be significantly more of a disclosure that the
juror would like. 160 The practical result may be that jurors with experiences most
relevant to determining bias have the greatest incentive to remain silent or
peijure themselves during voir dire. The Court also took for granted a juror's
ability to express her privacy concerns to a trial judge and demand privacy rights
without representation. In its Press Enterprise ruling, the Court may have put an
unfair burden on jurors, people who are not represented by counsel, by requiring
that they make an affirmative request for a hearing and then present their own
case without preparation at that hearing.
Consider a closeted gay, lesbian, or bisexual person living in a rural
environment with a small population. Being forced to admit that his or her
sexual orientation in a closed hearing could subject that person to a host of
negative consequences. Even having to admit that she or he is a member of an
organization that advocates gay rights or that she or he has contributed money to
a gay rights organization may incite suspicion. In a sparsely populated area
where venire members, attorneys, and the judge may know each other, the local
newspapers would not be needed for such information to quickly become public.
Even questions asking whether prospective jurors have ever been victims of
sexual orientation discrimination may reveal information that prospective jurors
would like to keep private.
Yet, if a judge were to refuse to allow a defendant in criminal cases to inquire
into prospective jurors' biases (assuming sexual orientation was an issue in the
case), it might arguably be a violation of that defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial jury. A defendant charged with gay bashing has just as much
interest in knowing jurors' biases for and against gay people as a gay criminal
defendant. However, as discussed above, inquiring into the jurors' sexual
orientation may not be necessary to determine bias. Voir dire beyond direct
questions regarding bias is usually not necessary.
B. Means of Questioning to Protect Jurors' Privacy About Their Sexual
Orientation
Courts have used a variety of tactics to determine bias while still attempting
to ensure juror privacy. One method is for the judge to ask jurors about their
160. Jennifer Sweeny Buckly, Press-Enterprise Co, v. Superior Court: A Juror's Right to Privacy, 2 DET.
C. L. REv. 649, 661-62 (1985).
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sexual orientation in a private voir dire in chambers.1 61 The court utilized private
voir dire in Hendricks v. Vasquez,162 a case in which the defendant was charged
with murdering gay men. While private voir dire assures greater privacy and
may induce a more honest response, the court should not use the more intimate
setting merely to determine jurors' sexual orientations. Questions calculated to
detect real bias are usually more appropriate for voir dire purposes. 163 In People
v. Bici,164 the judge only asked one prospective juror to privately reveal her
sexual orientation because she mentioned that she had gay friends during voir
dire in open court.165 However, in that case, the judge's decision to conduct
private voir dire outside the presence of the parties and their counsel was cause
for reversal because it interfered with the defendant's right to intelligently
exercise a peremptory strike. 1
66
Private voir dire on sensitive issues may also be useful to illicit bias if there
is reason to believe that jurors may be reluctant to admit bias in open court, even
outside of the presence of other jurors during individual voir dire. In State v. Van
Straten,167 a Wisconsin appellate court approved the trial judges' decision to
privately question potential jurors, four at a time, in extensive detail about
prejudices they might have developed as a result of pretrial publicity. The trial
court feared that media coverage about the defendant's sexual orientation, HIV
status, and an allegation that he had attempted to spray AIDS infected blood on
prison staff may have left some prospective jurors unable to consider the
evidence regarding the burglary charge in a fair and impartial manner. Despite
the fact that four prospective jurors admitted irreconcilable prejudice during voir
dire by the court and were excused for cause, the defendant argued that the voir
dire process poisoned the jury against him. The appellate court disagreed. 168
The use of an anonymous jury could remedy the fears of placing jurors in the
predicament of either lying about their sexual orientations (or about their
relationship with gay family members or friends) or risking adverse
ramifications of revealing the information while still protecting parties' rights to
inquire about possible bias. Courts usually keep the identities of jurors unknown
only when there is evidence that the jurors could be in danger. 169 However, an
161. Paul K Lynd, Comment, Juror Sexual Orientation: the Fair Cross-Section Requirement, Privacy,
Challenges for Cause, and Peremptories, 46 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 231, 249-251 (1998) (citing Randy Shilts,
Violence and Gays - A Turn of the Tide, S.F. CHRON., DEC. 10, 1981, at 29).
162. 974 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1992).
163. In Hendricks, the judge directly asked jurors to reveal their sexual orientations, but the trial judge
apparently determined that several gay venire members were capable of being impartial because the final jury
panel included gay jurors. Id.
164. 621 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1995).
165. Lynd, supra note 161, at 254.
166. Id.
167. 409 N.W.2d 448 (1987).
168. See also People v. Viggiani, 431 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1980). In that case, outside of the presence of the
other jurors, a juror revealed that he was gay. The appeals court in New York ruled that there was no error in
allowing the juror to remain on the jury even though a victim/witness was gay and there might have been some
testimony attacking gay people. Id. at 982.
169. Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in Criminal
Trials, 49 VAND. L. REv. 123 (1996) (arguing for more common use of anonymous juries).
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argument could be made that in certain situations, jurors should be anonymous if
voir dire requires extensive questioning into private matters such as one's sexual
orientation or connection with other gay people. Anonymous juries are not
necessarily shielded from each other, though. While the names and addresses of
the members of an anonymous jury are sealed, there is no guarantee that
anonymity will protect the privacy rights of jurors who live in small
communities if they are forced to reveal their sexual orientation during voir dire.
Less dramatic than the use of an anonymous jury, the use of a supplemental
juror questionnaire (an "SJQ") to elicit sensitive information may be an effective
means to ensure juror privacy. 170 Prospective jurors may be more forthcoming
about their attitudes toward gay, lesbian, and bisexual people when asked to
write their answers on a confidential form. 171 Assuming that jurors respond to
SJQs honestly, a written response serves the same purpose as individual voir dire
without consuming as much court time as individually questioning jurors
privately. SJQs may ask prospective jurors to indicate whether they agree or
disagree with commonly held beliefs, or the questions can be open-ended. As
with voir dire, the trial judge has discretion regarding the form, substance, and
number of questions asked on an SJQ.
If a court utilizes as SJQ, the judge and the litigants ought to be careful not to
destroy the jurors' confidence by questioning jurors further on the record about
their written answers. In the murder trial of John O'Connell, a gay man killed by
four gay bashers, the court asked jurors to check a box on the juror questionnaire
if they did not want to be asked publicly about their sexual orientation.17
2
However, in open court, the jurors were asked if they belonged to any gay
organizations or had any gay relatives. 173 Presumably, the trial judge did not
consider the possibility that a prospective juror who did not want to be
questioned about his or her sexual orientation would feel the same about being
questioned regarding memberships with gay organizations or gay family
members.
In State v. Lambert,'74 voir dire included a confidential questionnaire
consisting of questions concerning personal involvement with sexual abuse,
though questions regarding anti-gay bias were asked in general voir dire to the
whole panel. 175 This case illustrates how trial attorneys and judges can utilize a
variety of means to elicit prejudice. Although the reviewing court in Lambert
held that the trial judge has discretion to conduct voir dire as he sees fit, this
article argues that some of that discretion should be limited when it comes to
questioning jurors about attitudes regarding sexual orientation and other
sensitive issues.
170. STARR & MCCoRMICK, supra note 69, at §§ 11.01-11.03.
171. SJQs are usually sealed, and the courts usually limit who has access to them. Id. at § 11.8.10.
172. Lynd, supra note 161, at 254.
173. Id. at 253.
174. 528 A.2d 890, 892 (D. Me. 1987).
175. Id. at 891-92.
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In contrast to these cases, the judge presiding over the murder trial of Dan
White, the man who murdered Harvey Milk and the mayor of San Francisco,
refused to allow counsel on both sides the right to inquire into the sexual
orientations of the jurors. 176 It is not clear whether the decision was intended to
protect juror privacy. Nevertheless, the defense counsel used peremptory
challenges to strike anyone he thought was gay, based on questions calculated to
determine sexual orientation in an indirect fashion, and the result was a jury free
of gay members. 177 The lack of gay jurors is commonly thought have been a
significant factor in the jury's decision to give a relatively light sentence for one
of the most famous murders inspired by anti-gay hatred.178 The White murder
trial illustrates the need for judges to be sensitive to jurors' concerns of privacy,
but not allow privacy to be a cloak for discrimination that prevents a fair trial
and results in a loss of public confidence in the jury system.
It is plausible that jurors may be more willing to admit bias with regard to
issues of sexual orientation on a confidential questionnaire or in chambers than
in a courtroom. However, the dearth of information regarding jurors' willingness
to admit bias and/or reveal private information in various settings precludes any
definite assertions on the subject. Yet, there is evidence that individual
questioning is more likely to reveal more accurate information than in group
questioning. Therefore, whether voir dire on a private or sensitive matter takes
place on a questionnaire, in chambers, or in the courtroom, trial judges should, at
the very least, allow individual questioning rather than questions posed to the
entire panel, with the option to answer questions outside the presence of the
other jurors. This is probably the best way to obtain truthful information while
giving jurors some sense of privacy even when their privacy interests do not
warrant sealing their answers in the record.
CONCLUSION
Sexual orientation should be treated like race, religion, ethnicity, and gender
for the purposes of voir dire. A prospective juror's sexual orientation alone
should not be a permissible basis for a peremptory strike without some other
indication of bias. Although, as a general matter, jurors are reluctant to admit
bias, attorneys should not be permitted to presume bias regarding sexual
orientation just as they are not permitted to presume racial bias. Because the
purpose of voir dire is to reveal juror bias, it is appropriate that voir dire
questions be limited to those that are likely to serve that purpose rather than
those calculated only to reveal private information. Admittedly, any limit on voir
dire and the use peremptory strikes creates a tension with a party's right to
exercise a strike based on intuition. However, parties' efforts to strike potentially
unfavorable jurors must be balanced against the public's interest in the integrity
176. Id. at 247-48.
177. Id.
178. RANDY SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARVEY MILK 308 (1982).
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of the jury system - including the principle that classes of citizens will not be
presumed unqualified for jury service.
In order to ensure that bias is revealed and that jurors' privacy is respected,
voir dire concerning prejudice regarding sexual orientation and other sensitive
matters should be conducted individually and outside the presence of other
jurors. Such constraints on voir dire not only help to ensure that prospective
jurors are not excluded because of a presumption of bias, but also ensure that
voir dire does not needlessly expose jurors to embarrassment or to a loss of
reasonable privacy. If jurors feel at ease answering voir dire questions honestly
and completely, the end result will only aid parties' abilities to intelligently
exercise peremptory strikes in a manner that obtains impartial juries and bolsters
the public's confidence that the jury system is working.

